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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
BAR ADMISSIONS: VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION REQUIRING
DISCLOSURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP
Plaintiffs were individuals and New and Old Left organizations
representing a class of law students and recent law graduates planning
to seek admission to the New York Bar. They filed two actions for de-
claratory and injunctive relief in the Southern District of New York,
challenging the "character and fitness" requirement of the New York Bar
Examination. New York officials and judges charged with screening bar
applicants who have passed the written examination were named as
defendants.1 The complaints attacked New York's procedures for deter-
mining the "character and general fitness" of Bar applicants as overly
broad, vague, and violative of the applicants' right of privacy. A three-
judge court convened and consolidated the two suits. The court granted
partial relief, but upheld the bulk of New York's system, over a vigorous
dissent by Judge Constance Baker Motley. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, plaintiffs-appellants unsuccessfully renewed their
objections to New York's inquiry into applicants' associations and loyalty.
Held: affirmed; a state may, consistent with the first amendment,2 require
bar applicants to reveal knowing membership in organizations advocating
violent overthrow of the government. Law Student Civil Rights Research
Council v. Wadmond, 91 S. Ct. 720 (1971).3
The roots of the instant controversy extend back to Speiser v. Ran-
dall,4 wherein the United States Supreme Court invalidated California's
requirement that veterans execute a loyalty declaration as a condition
for obtaining a special tax exemption. Denial of an exemption was found
to be a penalty for engaging in certain types of speech and association.
Such restraints, the Court noted, bear a presumption of invalidity, which
must be dispelled by the state if the restraint is to stand.' Therefore, the
state, not the applicants for its public benefits, must bear the burden of
proof where loyalty is in question.
In the landmark case of Shelton v. Tucker,' the Court struck down
1. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (three-judge court); New York requires that an applicant for admission to its Bar
who has passed the required written examination satisfy a judicially appointed committee
of his character and general fitness to practice law. N.Y. JuDIcARY LAW § 90 (McKinney
1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RuLEs, Rule 9404 (McKinney 1963). Each applicant must
complete a questionnaire composed by the committee and obtain affidavits of good moral
character from two "reputable" residents of his county. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULxs,
Rule 9404 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. Juoica.xy LAW § 528.1 (McKinney 1968).
2. Appellants argued that the first amendment prohibited New York from requiring
each applicant to disclose innocent membership in "violent advocacy" organizations, to
state that he "believes in the form of government of the United States" and is ready to
swear a loyalty oath "without any mental reservation," and to bear the burden of proving
his loyalty.
3. Hereinafter cited as LSCRRC.
4. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
5. Id. at 529.
6. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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as overbroad an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to file affidavits
listing all their organizational affiliations within the preceding five years.
Justice Stewart, writing for the 5-4 majority, found the state's inquiry
relevant and its interest significant, but nevertheless held that even valid
purposes may not be achieved "by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."7
The applicability of Speiser and Shelton to bar admissions was ini-
tially resolved by Konigsberg v. State Bar.' The California Bar Exam-
iners refused to certify applicant Konigsberg, on the basis that his refusal
to answer questions regarding possible Communist Party affiliation ob-
structed a full investigation of his qualifications. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Harlan, upheld the Bar Examiners in a 5-4
decision. To Konigsberg's first amendment challenge, the Court responded
that California's interest in obtaining full information regarding an ap-
plicant's character outweighed any deterrent effect on freedom of speech
and association. Shelton was distinguished on the bases that the ques-
tions asked by California were limited to Communist affiliation, and that
the typical bar examination committee, due to financial limitations, had
available to it no "less drastic means" of investigation.9 Konigsberg also
sought unsuccessfully to apply Speiser to bar questionnaires, but the
necessity of reaching this issue was obviated by allowing California to
deny certification for failure to answer. The subsequent issue of who
would bear the burden of proof had Konigsberg answered the questions
was thus avoided.
The companion case to Konigsberg, In re Anastaplo,'° upheld Illi-
nois' refusal to certify an applicant on grounds similar to those sus-
tained in Konigsberg. Subsequent cases have, however, marked a retreat
from the broad "loyalty" inquiry allowed in Konigsberg and Anastaplo.
Five years after Konigsberg, the Court in Bond v. Floyd" unanimously
denied Georgia's claim that it had the power to test the sincerity of a
state legislator's loyalty oath, on the grounds that first amendment
freedoms of speech and association were violated. The Court held that
such a power could too easily be used to restrict the right of dissent.
The following year produced yet another 5-4 "loyalty" decision in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents." New York required its university em-
ployees to reveal, as a condition of employment, whether they had ever
been members of societies advocating the doctrine of forcible overthrow
of the government. The Court struck down this requirement on the
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, thus extending Shelton into the
7. Id. at 488.
8. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
9. Id. at 41.
10. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
11. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
12. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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"loyalty" area. That same year, in United States v. Robel, the Court
held that a provision in the Subversive Activities Control Act which pro-
hibited all members of designated communist-action organizations from
holding any employment in defense facilities, was unconstitutionally
broad. The Court agreed that vital security interests were involved, but
applied the "less drastic means" test because first amendment freedoms
of speech and association were inhibited by the Act. Finally, in Branden-
burg v. Ohio,14 the Court further restricted the scope of punishable
advocacy. Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act was found to be overbroad
because it failed to distinguish between mere advocacy, and incitement
to imminent lawless action. Under Brandenburg, a state may criminally
sanction only the latter type of conduct.
Two companion cases were decided with the instant case: In re
Stolar"5 and Baird v. Arizona.' The facts in each involved a state bar
examiner's refusal to certify applicants for declining to answer questions
relating to their political beliefs and affiliations. Both decisions hold that
the applicant's refusal to submit to forced disclosure is protected under
the first amendment. Applicant Stolar refused to state whether he was
or had ever been a member of any organization which advocated forcible
overthrow of the government. He further refused to list the names of all
clubs and organizations of which he had ever been a member. Miss Baird,
in response to the Arizona questionnaire, refused to state whether she
had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization
that advocates overthrow of the government by force or violence.
Justice Black, writing for himself and Justices Douglas, Brennan
and Marshall, together with Justice Stewart who concurred separately,
comprised the Stolar and Baird majority. They agreed that the first
amendment's protection of association and speech, as enunciated in
Robel, prohibits Arizona and Ohio from punishing an applicant for mere
membership or beliefs. Therefore, the questions asked of the two peti-
tioners served "no legitimate state interest.' 1 7 The opinions of both Jus-
tices apply the "less drastic means" test enunciated in Shelton to strike
Ohio's demand that applicants list all of their associational memberships.
Although neither Justice specifically disapproves Konigsberg or Anasta-
plo, as Justice Blackmun, writing for the four dissenters in Baird notes,
both cases have lost much of their vitality.'
The broad thrust of appellant's attack in the instant case was
sharply pared by Justice Stewart. To the argument that New York's de-
tailed inquiry into an applicant's previously private life works a "chill-
ing effect," Justice Stewart responded that New York had been scrupulous
13. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
15. 91 S. Ct. 713 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Stolar].
16. 91 S. Ct. 702 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Baird].
17. Stolar at 717.
18. Baird at 708 (dissenting opinion).
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in the use of its powers, and therefore no chilling effect need result.19
Justice Stewart emphasized "at the outset that no person involved in this
case has been refused admission to the New York Bar.120 The Court
saw little merit in appellant's contention that the requirement that an
applicant submit third-party "moral character" affidavits constituted an
invasion of privacy. The Court found no such invasion because an appli-
cant is free to choose the persons who will submit the affidavits.2
Appellants argued that the statutory directive prohibiting certifica-
tion of an applicant "unless he shall furnish satisfactory proof to the
effect" that he "believes in the form of the government of the United
States and is loyal to such government" placed an impermissible burden
of proof on an applicant and intruded into the absolutely-privileged
domain of personal belief.22 The Court agreed that the unvarnished statu-
tory language presented serious constitutional problems. However, it was
willing to accord appellee's narrowing interpretation at least "respectful
consideration. ' Thus construed, the rule places no burden of proof
upon applicants, and the problems present in Speiser are circumvented. 2
In addition, the Court accepted appellee's limiting interpretation of the
statutory language regarding belief in and loyalty to "the form of the
government of the United States." Were this read as a statutory autho-
rization of inquiry into an applicant's political beliefs, independent
of his actions, Robel would offer a formidable challenge to its validity.2
However, appellees construed the phrase "form of the government" to
refer only to the Constitution, and "belief" and "loyalty"' to mean
merely a willingness and ability to take the oath in good faith.26 The
majority of the Court also accepted appellee's construction of Question
27 of the application, which asked applicants whether they were able to
take the oath "conscientiously" and "without any mental reservation. 27
This question was interpreted by both the Bar and the Court to inquire
only as to whether the applicant would swear to the oath pro forma while
manifesting disagreement with or indifference to it. Justice Stewart noted
that this limited inquiry had been specifically exempted from invalidation
19. LSCRRC at 729.
20. Id. at 724.
21. Id. at 725.
22. Brief for Appellants at 11-43, LSCRRC.
23. LSCRRC at 726.
24. Id. at 727.
25. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The same or similar distinction was
required in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) and Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966).
26. LSCRRC at 727.
27. New York Bar Application Question 27 reads as follows:
27(a) Is there any reason why you cannot take and subscribe to an oath or affirma-
tion that you will support the constitutions of the United States and of the State of
New York? If there is, please explain.(b) -Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without any men-
tal reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States?
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in Bond v. Floyd, and was acceptable in the absence of a showing that it
had been used to penalize political beliefs.'
Question 26(a), which asks an applicant whether he has ever know-
ingly been associated with a group that advocates unlawful overthrow of
a government,29 was sustained by the majority despite the decisions in
Stolar and Baird. Justice Stewart was careful to note two factors on which
these cases could be distinguished. First, he re-emphasized that, unlike
the two companion cases, none of the appellants in the instant case had
been refused admission to the New York Bar on the basis of his answer,
or a failure to answer, this question.30 Second, he refused to consider
26(a) apart from its "follow-up," 26(b), which requires an applicant
who answers 26(a) affirmatively to state whether he intended to further
the organization's aims "by force, violence, or any unlawful means."'"
Justice Stewart found that knowing membership with specific intent to
further illegal goals is punishable, and is thus properly subject to inquiry.
New York's inquiry into knowing membership irrespective of intent was
sustained on the authority of Konigsberg, despite its apparent erosion
in Stolar and Baird. The division of Question 26 into two parts was fur-
ther approved on the basis that it narrows the class of applicants whom
the committee need further investigate.12 "For those who answer part (a)
in the negative, that is the end of the matter."3 Whether such a function
could as well be served by a single question limited to prohibited member-
ship is not considered by the majority, despite the Robel and Shelton
mandate that "less drastic means" be explored. The majority of the Court
considers inquiry into an individual's associational ties essential to a
profession "dedicated to the peaceful and reasoned settlement of dis-
putes." 4 The appellants, however, share a much different perspective.
They speak of the important need for lawyers who are committed to the
law as a tool for pursuing social justice . . ." and who will vigorously
defend those who challenge current social presumptions." The majority
in the instant case takes a narrower view of the lawyer's role, and upholds
28. LSCRRC at 727.
29. New York Bar Application Question 26(a) reads as follows:
26(a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any
organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or
association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the
United States or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or over-
turned by force, violence or any unlawful means?-If your answer is in the affirma-
tive, state the facts below.
30. LSCRRC at 727-28.
31. New York Bar Application Question 26(b) reads as follows:
26(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such
membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such
organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the
United States or any State or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence
or any unlawful means?
32. LSCRRC at 728.
33. Id. n.19.
34. Id. at 728.
35. Brief for Appellants at 15, LSCRRC.
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New York's associational inquiry as a method of screening out potential
lawyers whose background reveals an indisposition to seek change wholly
within the current legal system.
Two dissents were written. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, would adopt appellants' specific attacks on questions 26 and
27.36 Appellees' narrow construction is rejected as contrary to the clear
meaning of the statutory language and as unsupported in case law or
past administrative practices. Justice Marshall considers New York's
inquiry into a prospective oath-taker's "sincerity" to have been flatly
repudiated by Bond v. Floyd. He views Question 26(a) as overbroad in
that it inquires into a type of membership which may not under Robel,
Brandenburg, and Keyishian, be used to deny a person a public benefit.
The other dissent, written by Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas,
would hold that first amendment freedoms of speech and association
prevent New York from excluding an applicant for knowing membership,
even if the applicant shared the organization's aim of violent overthrow."7
Aside from his own views on the first amendment, Justice Black finds the
majority position irreconcilable with other decisions of the Court. As-
suming that appellees' interpretation of New York's burden of proof were
correct, an applicant must still answer Question 27 in the affirmative be-
fore he can be certified. Justice Black found this burden of "coming for-
ward with evidence" improper under Speiser.8s He shares Justice Mar-
shall's views on Questions 26 and 27, and adds that:
[T] he Court's holding permits the knowledge and specific intent
elements of Question 26 to be split into two parts. This allows
the State to force an applicant to supply information about his
associations, which, even under the majority's rationale, are
protected by the First Amendment. 9
Moreover, Justice Black cannot reconcile the instant decision with Baird
and Stolar, which invalidated questions prying into activities protected
by the first amendment.
The instant case sharply defines the extent to which State Bar "char-
acter" committees may inquire into an applicant's associational ties.
Stolar, consistent with Shelton, prohibits unrestricted inquiry into all
organizations of which an applicant has even been a member. Stolar and
Baird prevent the state from asking an applicant whether she has ever
been a member of an organization that advocates violent overthrow of
the government. However, the instant case permits inquiry into knowing
membership where it is preliminary to a more limited question addressed
to specific intent, and where an affirmative response does not constitute
an independent basis for denial of admission. As Justice Black argued,
36. LSCRRC at 737 (dissenting opinion).
37. LSCRRC at 731 (dissenting opinion).
38. Id. at 733.
39. Id. at 736.
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the soundness of this distinction is questionable. Mere membership,
whether knowing or unknowing, is constitutionally protected under Robel
and Brandenburg. Consequently, as Baird holds, the state has no legiti-
mate interest in demanding disclosure of membership, unless that inquiry
is confined to membership on the part of one sharing the specific intent
to further the organization's unlawful aims. Therefore, the Court's vali-
dation of New York's Question 26 (a) is inconsistent with the reasoning of
Baird and Stolar. Konigsberg is undermined by these companion cases,
but upheld by the instant case. Its continued vitality is, therefore,
uncertain.
The significance of the decision noted herein extends beyond the
narrow confines of the bar admission question. It stands as a further
indication of the Burger Court's retreat from Dombrowski, begun in
Younger v. Harris.40 Appellants' heavy reliance on a "chilling effect"
failed to win them the relief granted, on closely-related grounds, to re-
jected applicants Stolar and Baird.
The instant decision also reveals that a majority of the present Court
holds a "traditional" view of the lawyer's role in society, one more akin
to "officer of the court" than to "vigorous advocate of social change."
These attitudes may be expected to collide with increasing frequency in
the future.
JAMES T. HENDRICK
FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATE
PROSECUTIONS RECONSIDERED
Harris was indicted and charged with a violation of the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act.' Thereafter, Harris filed suit in a federal dis-
trict court to enjoin Younger, the District Attorney for Los Angeles
County, from prosecuting him.2 Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch, members of
the Progressive Labor Party, and Farrell Broslawsky, a history professor,
intervened as plaintiffs in the district court suit.3 All alleged that immedi-
40. 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971). Noted in 25 U. MIAmi L. REv. 506 (1971).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1961).
2. Harris alleged "the prosecution and even the presence of the Act inhibited him in the
exercise of his rights of free speech and press, rights guaranteed to him by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 748 (1971).
3. Dan and Hirsch alleged that
the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them as members of the Progressive Labor
Party from peacefully advocating the program of their party which was to replace
capitalism with socialism and to abolish the profit system of production in this
country. Id.
Broslawsky alleged "the prosecution of Harris made him uncertain as to whether he could
teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his
classwork." Id.
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